

Approved For Release 2002/02/12 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000800030002-4

I. As a result of army defections on the island of Sumatra, the Indonesian Government now faces both the threat of civil war and the danger of a resumption of Communist influence on a more serious scale than at any time since 1948.

A. The immediate military problem is in North Sumatra, where the colorful local military commander, Col. Simbolon, seized the provincial government at Medan and severed relations with the central government on 22 December.

1. Simbolon, in turn, was deposed on 27 December by Lt. Colonel Ginting, an officer loyal to the central government.

2. Simbolon, who escaped from Medan, has been given until

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

B. Simbolon, at last reports, has reached the town of Tarutung in his home district of Tapanuli (on the Indian Ocean coast). At least 18 months ago, Simbolon erected barracks and ammunition dumps in Tapanuli, where he is the "favorite son" of some million Christian Bataks. Tarutung is H.Q. of the Third Regiment, which has declared for Simbolon, as has the First Regiment (at Kutaradja, in the north).

1. Of the 13,000 troops in North Sumatra, about half are now believed loyal to Simbolon, while the other half are presently supporting Ginting.

II. Earlier, in Central Sumatra, a local army commander (Lt. Col. Hussein) subordinate to Simbolon assumed control of the provincial government on 20 December, claiming dissatisfaction

with the central government.

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2002/02/12 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000800030002-4

A. Hussein, who commands 10,000 troops, has stated that he was forced "to take the helm into his own hands" because the central government no longer considered the "wishes and aspirations" of the central Sumatra people.

B. At present, there appears to be a close connection between Hussein and Simbolon.

C. Another dissident army officer, former Chief of Staff Lubis--who attempted a coup against the Ali government in mid-November--

25X1X7

joined Simbolon on North Sumatra.

25X1X7

III. Finally, the civilian governor of South Sumatra, on 24 December, blocked further transfer of funds and revenues normally flowing to Djakarta. Although the governor claims his action is aimed

~~SECRET~~

at accelerating needed development and reconstruction in his province, and had nothing to do with "politics and provincial-

ism," there is a possibility of complicity with Simbolon. The military commander in South Sumatra, with 10,000 troops, appears to be cooperating with the civilian governor.

IV. In this situation, the problem facing the central government is three-fold.

A. First is a direct threat to survival of the Ali cabinet.

1. The disaffected army elements in both North and Central Sumatra have called for the cabinet's resignation and a return to leadership of former vice president Hatta, himself a Sumatran.

2. President Sukarno, Prime Minister Ali and his National Party, however, are reported determined to preserve

2 January 1957

Approved For Release 2002/02/12 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000800030002-4

~~SECRET~~
~~SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

I. Soviet influence in Afghanistan has continued to grow throughout 1956.

A. In the economic aid field, more than a dozen development projects are now under way, financed by a Soviet credit of \$100 million, granted in 1955.

1. Heavy use of the Soviet transit route for Afghan foreign trade shipments has continued.

B. Throughout 1956, small shipments of Soviet arms have arrived. In the past two-and-a-half months, however, these arms shipments have been stepped up.

II. The extent of this Soviet arms build-up is not completely clear, but a beefing-up of the antiquated Afghan Air Force appears to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-280
DATE: 1-16-80
REVIEWER: 372044

be an obvious priority.

~~SECRET~~

25X1

A.

11

to 17 jet fighters (either MIG-15s or 17s) arrived in Mazar-i-Sharif at the end of October, while 36 to 48 piston trainers (including YAK-12s, YAK-18s, and even a few helicopters) were flown from the USSR to Kabul about the same time.

25X1

III. The Soviets are also undertaking both airfield construction and personnel training for the Afghan air force.

25X1X7

A.

35 Soviet technicians

are present at Mazar-i-Sharif for supervision of work on a

- 2 -

new airfield (to include concrete runways, radar installations and hangars).
Approved For Release 2002/02/12 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000800030002-4

25X1C

1. [REDACTED] as many as 200 Afghans being assigned to Mazar-i-Sharif for training.

B. The Soviets also have agreed to construct a new military airfield north of Kabul.

25X1C

1. [REDACTED] two additional new airfields in the north (Tashkurgan and Kunduz) and one in the southeast (at Matun, near the Pakistan border) are also planned.

C.

25X1X7

D. In ground equipment, the Afghans have also received a number

IV. Absorption of these Soviet arms will take some time but the
Approved For Release 2002/02/12 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000800030002-4
Afghan build-up--particularly the air build-up--has serious
implications.

A. First, it represents Soviet penetration into a new and
strategic sector of Afghan national affairs--the military--
on which the power of the Afghan government rests to a
considerable degree.

B. Second, an up-to-date Afghan air force--which should become
effective in a few years--would to all intents be a Soviet-
controlled weapon in South Asia.

1. For example, the Soviets could benefit from Afghan re-
connaissance flights over strategic Pakistani installa-
tions (including those of interest to the US).

C. Perhaps the greatest [and most immediate] danger is that the ^{presence} ~~presence~~ of new arms in Afghanistan could induce Pakistan to take preventive action--to cripple the Afghan military establishment before it had managed to absorb the new Soviet equipment.

1. In the same fashion, the Afghans, stimulated by the mere possession of this new equipment, might be unable to resist the temptation to ^{make} hostile moves against Pakistan.
2. ^{These moves would probably center on} This temptation would be particularly strong with regard to the Pushtoonistan border area, long in dispute between the two countries.
3. Heretofore, Pakistan's great advantage in this dispute has been uncontested control of the air over Pushtoonistan.

~~SECRET~~
BACKGROUND--STATUS OF ROYAL AFGHAN AIR FORCE

Approved For Release 2002/02/12 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000800030002-4

- I. On 1 August 1956 (before receipt of Soviet aid) the Afghan Air Force had the following composition:

A. Aircraft Strength:

<u>Fighters (piston)</u>	12	(6 Hawker Hind, 6 Alfa Romeo)
<u>Transport-Bombers</u>	11	(Avro Anson)
<u>Trainer (piston)</u>	4	(Tiger Moths)

TOTAL 27 (only about 50% operational)

- B. Disposition: All aircraft stationed at Kabul.

C. Personnel Strength:

<u>Pilots</u>	35	(none jet-trained: only 6 considered competent in existing equipment)
---------------	----	---

All others
(officers and men) 56

TOTAL 91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. Average flying time of pilots: less than two hours a month.

Afghanistan

